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Abstract
The Fermi paradox is the conflict between an expectation of a high
ex ante probability of intelligent life elsewhere in the universe and the
apparently lifeless universe we in fact observe. The expectation that the
universe should be teeming with intelligent life is linked to models like the
Drake equation, which suggest that even if the probability of intelligent
life developing at a given site is small, the sheer multitude of possible
sites should nonetheless yield a large number of potentially observable
civilizations. We show that this conflict arises from the use of Drake-like
equations, which implicitly assume certainty regarding highly uncertain
parameters. We examine these parameters, incorporating models of chem-
ical and genetic transitions on paths to the origin of life, and show that
extant scientific knowledge corresponds to uncertainties that span multi-
ple orders of magnitude. This makes a stark difference. When the model
is recast to represent realistic distributions of uncertainty, we find a sub-
stantial ex ante probability of there being no other intelligent life in our
observable universe, and thus that there should be little surprise when
we fail to detect any signs of it. This result dissolves the Fermi paradox,
and in doing so removes any need to invoke speculative mechanisms by
which civilizations would inevitably fail to have observable effects upon
the universe.
1 Introduction
While working at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in 1950, Enrico Fermi
famously asked his colleagues: ”Where are they?” [1]. He was pointing to a
discrepancy that he found puzzling: Given that there are so many stars in our
galaxy, even a modest probability of extraterrestrial intelligence (ETI) arising
around any given star would imply the emergence of many such civilizations
within our galaxy. Further, given modest assumptions about their ability to
travel, to modify their environs, or to communicate, we should see evidence of
their existence, and yet we do not. This discrepancy has become known as the
Fermi paradox, and we shall call the apparent lifelessness of the universe the
Fermi observation.
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Many hypotheses have been suggested in efforts to resolve the Fermi paradox,
for example, that all other civilizations are deliberately concealing themselves,
or that they all annihilate themselves before successfully traveling or communi-
cating at interstellar distances. A major difficulty for such hypotheses is that
the putative mechanism must be extremely reliable: If only 99% of other civ-
ilizations annihilated themselves, this would do little to resolve the paradox.
These hypotheses are thus highly speculative, relying on strong implicit claims
about universal alien motivations or social dynamics, when we cannot claim
similar knowledge of our own world. These hypotheses are entertained not out
of independent scientific plausibility, but because they are seen as potential
explanations of he Fermi observation.
Our main result is to show that proper treatment of scientific uncertainties
dissolves the Fermi paradox by showing that it is not at all unlikely ex ante for us
to be alone in the Milky Way, or in the observable universe. Our second result
is to show that, taking account of observational bounds on the prevalence of
other civilizations, our updated probabilities suggest that there is a substantial
probability that we are alone. Our third result is that pessimism for the survival
of humanity based on the Fermi paradox is unfounded.
1.1 The Drake Equation
The key assumption of the Fermi paradox is that the number of sites where
alien civilizations could emerge is so large that for any reasonable probability of
emergence, some would have emerged and we should expect to have detected one
or more of them. This sites × probability approach fits within the well-known
Drake equation framework, which we shall take to be the paradigm example of
this form of reasoning about the prior probability of ETI.
The Drake equation was intended as a rough way to estimate of the number
of detectable/contactable civilizations in the Milky Way (N) [2], phrased as a
product of seven factors1:
N = R∗fpneflfifcL
Where: R∗ is the rate of star formation per year, fp is the fraction of stars
with planets, ne is the number of Earth-like (or otherwise habitable) planets
per system with planets, fl is the fraction of such planets with life, fi is the
fraction with life that develop intelligence, fc is the fraction of intelligent civi-
lizations that are detectable/contactable, and L is the average longevity of such
detectable civilizations in years.
The Drake equation has been a mainstay in the SETI debate, sometimes
being used to directly estimate the number of civilizations in the galaxy, but
perhaps more often being used as an analysis tool. For example, it has played
a prominent role in debating the rationality of SETI efforts. This approach
1While there exist various similar formulations, we will focus on the classic Drake Equa-
tion. Those who prefer the other formulations should have no great difficulty transferring our
conclusions to their preferred framework.
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to the Drake equation is well summed up by Jill Tarter, who said ”The Drake
Equation is a wonderful way to organize our ignorance” [3].
But while the equation is often invoked as a way of reasoning about uncer-
tainties and ignorance, the actual practice is often considered to be somewhat
suspect. Many papers state that some of their parameter choices are just their
best guesses, though this fails to provide an appropriate framework for interpret-
ing the result. It is common to see carefully estimated astrophysical numbers
multiplied by these ad hoc guesses. It has been noted that the final results seem
to depend heavily on the pessimism or optimism of the authors, falling into the
”N ≈ L” and ”N ≈ 1” schools respectively. Steven J. Dick provides a typical
statement of this worry: ”Perhaps never in the history of science has an equa-
tion been devised yielding values differing by eight orders of magnitude. ... each
scientist seems to bring his own prejudices and assumptions to the problem.”
[4]
Nevertheless, an equation showing the degree of divergence in estimates can
be very valuable. The problem is when systematic biases and assumptions
dominate the results. As we will see, the fact that answers only span eight
orders of magnitude appears to be due to overconfidence – the range should be
substantially wider.
While all practitioners acknowledge the great uncertainty around the pa-
rameters of the Drake equation, very few incorporate this into their quantitative
models. The Drake equation (and related models) are almost always used with
point estimates for each parameter, rather than ranges or probability distribu-
tions. If the result is used to estimate the chance of ETI in our galaxy (as is
common when introducing the Fermi paradox), this can be extremely mislead-
ing. It is not enough to claim that the output of the equation is just an order
of magnitude estimate: scientific uncertainty about the parameters does not
constrain the output to one or even a handful of orders of magnitude. In our
view the practice of using point estimates in Drake equation-like frameworks is
largely responsible for the continued puzzlement about the Fermi paradox.
1.2 Knowledge claims of point estimates
It is instructive to ask what knowledge claims about the parameters are implicit
in the use of point estimates. The answer is that they implicitly claim complete
certainty about all the parameters. We shall see that it is this presupposition of
certainty that is creating the appearance of a paradox (by falsely representing
how certain we are that there are many civilizations out there). In this paper
we provide a principled approach to assessing the reasonable uncertainty in each
parameter via consideration of what knowledge is being claimed, and to tracking
this uncertainty through the calculation, showing how this proper management
of our uncertainties dissolves the apparent paradox.
To quickly see the problems point estimates can cause, consider the following
toy example. There are nine parameters (f1, f2, . . .) multiplied together to give
the probability of ETI arising at each star. Suppose that our true state of
knowledge is that each parameter could lie anywhere in the interval [0, 0.2],
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with our uncertainty being uniform across this interval, and being uncorrelated
between parameters. In this example, the point estimate for each parameter is
0.1, so the product of point estimates is a probability of 1 in a billion. Given a
galaxy of 100 billion stars, the expected number of life-bearing stars would be
100, and the probability of all 100 billion events failing to produce intelligent
civilizations can be shown to be vanishingly small: 3.7× 10−44. Thus in this toy
model, the point estimate approach would produce a Fermi paradox: a conflict
between the prior extremely low probability of a galaxy devoid of ETI and our
failure to detect any signs of it.
However, the result is extremely different if, rather than using point esti-
mates, we take account of our uncertainty in the parameters by treating each
parameter as if it were uniformly drawn from the interval [0, 0.2]. Monte Carlo
simulation shows that this actually produces an empty galaxy 21.45% of the
time: a result that is easily reconcilable with our observations and thus gener-
ating no paradox for us to explain. That is to say, given our uncertainty about
the values of the parameters, we should not actually be all that surprised to see
an empty galaxy. The probability is much higher than under the point estimate
approach because it is not that unlikely to get a low product of these factors
(such as 1 in 200 billion) after which a galaxy without ETI becomes quite likely.
In this toy case, the point estimate approach was getting the answer wrong by
more than 42 orders of magnitude and was responsible for the appearance of a
paradox.
In this paper, we shall look at two different ways of extending this approach
beyond a toy model — generating probability distributions for the parameters
of the Drake equation based on the variation in historical estimates and doing
so based on the authors’ best judgment of the scientific uncertainties for each
parameter. In both cases, we see an effect like the one in this toy model, making
a galaxy (or observable universe) without ETI quite plausible ex ante and thus
dissolving any apparent paradox.
It should be noted that there do exist some cases in the literature using
estimated uncertainties rather than point estimates, such as treating each factor
as uniformly distributed in an uncertainty interval and then convolving them
into a final distribution [5], or treating the system as a stochastic process [6]
or Monte Carlo simulation [7]. The probability of life emerging has also been
studied in a Bayesian framework [8]. While these papers aim at improving the
precision of the Drake equation they do not apply their conclusions directly at
resolving the Fermi paradox. It is also possible to use the Drake equation to
derive bounds on the parameters using the Fermi observation [9].
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2 Using variation in point estimates to model
uncertainty
The literature on the Drake equation contains dozens of point-estimate based
calculations for N (the number of detectable civilizations in our galaxy).2 These
estimates span 11 orders of magnitude: from 3× 10−4 to 1× 108. While each
estimate does not contain information about its uncertainty, one could use the
variation in the estimates as a proxy for uncertainty in the result. We can do
even better if we decompose these estimates into the estimates for each of the
parameters and then recombine them in different ways. This gives us a feeling
for how likely we should find it that new estimates would fall outside the range
of existing estimates, and how far outside this range they might fall.
We do this by generating synthetic point estimates for N by randomly sam-
pling each parameter from the set of estimates for that parameter, and then
multiplying these together. Doing this many times produces the following pic-
ture of the ’collective’ view of the research community’s uncertainty about N ,
shown in Fig. 1.
Of the raw literature estimates for N , 64% have N > 100. As we saw in the
toy model, such values of N correspond to probabilities of less than 3.7× 10−44
that we are alone in our galaxy. So if we took any of those estimates at face
value, we would face a serious discrepancy with our observations and thus a
Fermi paradox.
However, adjusting for the implicit uncertainty in the literature changes this
story dramatically. While most of the synthetic estimates of N are above 1
and the peak of the distribution is on the optimistic side (mean 53 million,
median 100), there exists a pessimistic tail due to the existence of some very
low parameter estimates. This tail is extremely broad, spanning more than 30
orders of magnitude.
Given this synthetic distribution for the community’s uncertainty, the total
credence for N < 1 is 30%. To show that this isn’t purely driven by outliers, the
bootstrap confidence interval for N < 1 is [27%, 52%]. This suggests that people
who take the views of most members of the research community seriously should
ascribe something like a one in three chance to being alone3 in the galaxy and
so should not be greatly surprised by our lack of evidence of other civilizations.
The probability ofN < 10−10 (such that we are alone in the observable universe)
is 10% (CI [0.2%, 20%]). Thus the implicit view of the literature is that being
completely alone is distinctly possible, albeit unlikely.
Given a distribution of N , we can calculate the distribution of the expected
distance to the nearest civilization. Again the synthetic distribution has an
2The estimates can be found in Supplement III.
3It should be noted that an estimate of N = 1 means that the expected number of civi-
lizations in the Milky Way is 1, not that the actual number is 1. The probability of an empty
galaxy given N is (1 − N/NMW )
NMW ≈ e−N , where NMW is the number of stars in the
galaxy. However, for our purposes the difference between
∫
∞
0
e−NP (N)dN and Pr[N < 1] is
so small (1% in this case) that we will simply use estimates of Pr[N < 1] as the probability
of our being alone in the galaxy.
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Figure 1: (A) The uncertainty in the research community represented via a syn-
thetic probability density function over N — the expected number of detectable
civilizations in our galaxy. The curve is generated by random sampling from the
literature estimates of each parameter. Direct literature estimates of the num-
ber of detectable civilizations are marked with red rings. (B) The corresponding
synthetic cumulative density function. (C) A cumulative density function for the
distance to the nearest detectable civilization, estimated via a mixture model of
the nearest neighbor functions F (D < r|N) = 1− e−4pir
3ρ(r)N/3NMW where ρ(r)
is a sigmoid fit between the star density in the Milky Way and the lower density
at larger scales and NMW = 300× 10
9 is the number of stars in the Milky Way.
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optimistic outlook, with a 50% chance of it being within a kiloparsec, but also a
non-trivial probability to the nearest civilization being far beyond the observable
universe.
3 Estimates of current scientific uncertainties
While the above analysis indirectly estimated uncertainty in the Drake parame-
ters via their variability across the SETI literature, we can also directly estimate
some of the uncertainties using domain specific information for each parameter.
In particular, in the next section we will show that there are good reasons to
assume a far greater uncertainty for fl and fi than is common in the SETI
literature.
In the following we will commonly be dealing with uncertainties covering
many orders of magnitude. Hence it will be convenient to have a way of sum-
marising such degrees of uncertainty. We shall thus define the ”log-uncertainty”
of a parameter X (LU[X ]) as an estimate of the number of orders of magni-
tude covered by our current, rationally founded, uncertainty. Thus if we say
LU[X ] = 3, we mean that it would be bold to claim that the scientific uncer-
tainty covers less than three orders of magnitude based on our current informa-
tion.
For an overview of historical estimates of the parameters, see [2].
R∗ is fairly well constrained by astronomical data. While star formation rates
in other galaxies may vary over 5 orders of magnitude and there has likely been
some significant time variation in the Milky Way, the actual current uncertainty
is from 2 to 16 solar masses, LU[R∗] ≈ 0.9.
Different methods are converging on fp ≈ 1. LU[fp] < 1. Estimates of ne
remain far more uncertain, ranging from < 10−12 in rare earth arguments to > 1
when taking non-terrestrial environments like icy moons into account. Hence
it can be argued that LU[ne] > 12, although the post-2000 literature estimates
only covers 6 orders of magnitude. Much of the disagreement is about what
requirements go into the ne term and which ones go into the fl term. For our
purposes we will take an earth-like planet to be be little more than a rocky
planet in a habitable zone and thus assume that LU[ne] ≈ 2.
fl and fi are highly uncertain, and will be examined in the next section.
Similarly there are no clear arguments for the range of uncertainty of fc: the
range of estimates in the literature from 10−2 to 1 give LU[fc] = 2, but it is
clear a broader range is intended.
The final L factor ranges between 50 < L < 109−1010 years, giving LU[L] =
8.3. The upper limit occurs because the Drake equation assumes a steady
state: even if civilizations survived 1011 years instead of 1010 years, this would
not increase the number of them found in our galaxy since insufficient time
has elapsed for this to make a difference. Thus for practical use of the Drake
equation we can cut off the distribution at 1010 years.
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3.1 Scientific uncertainty in fl and fi
We shall now provide a sketch of the deep scientific uncertainties regarding fl
and fi. A substantially more detailed account can be found in supplement I.
As noted by Carter and McCrea [10] the evidential power of the early emer-
gence of life on Earth is weakened by observer selection effects, allowing for
deep uncertainty about what the natural timescale of life formation is. By their
argument one cannot assume it lies within the habitability span of Earth.
Following [8], we model abiogenesis events as physical transitions that occur
at some rate per unit time per unit volume of a suitable prebiotic substrate.
The probability of observing such an event on a potentially habitable planet
with volume V of substrate, during the available period t, with an abiogenesis
rate λ transitions per unit volume and time is fl = 1− e
−λV t. For small values,
fl ≈ λV t.
We take t to range from ≈107 yr to 1010 yr depending on whether abiogenesis
can happen only during a rare period of global geological change or at any time
during an interval of planetary habitability. Thus LU[t] ≈ 3.
There is more uncertainty concerning V , the volume of prebiotic substrate
in which abiogenesis could occur. Abiotic polymerization may be limited to
occurring in a thin film of substrate in a region with adequate geothermal heating
[11] [12] and productive outcomes may require local concentrations of specific
monomers orders of magnitude higher than the average prebiotic levels [13].
Each of these issues could reduce V by 10 or more orders of magnitude relative
to deeper substrates over a substantial fraction of a planetary surface. We will
therefore take LU[V ] ≥ 20.
There is great uncertainty concerning λ, the volumetric rate parameter for
abiogenesis events. Supplement I takes the frequency of bacterial cell division
per bacterial volume as an extremely conservative upper bound on λ, and consid-
ers potential lower bounds motivated by the so-called Levinthal protein-folding
paradox [14] [15], which arises in a model of folding that postulates a (counter-
factually) random search among alternative peptide backbone conformations.
In the Levinthal model, rates decline exponentially with protein size, with
waiting times ≫ 10200 times the present age of the universe for the folding
of a moderate-size protein. In reality, rapid protein folding is enabled by a
”funnel-like” energy surface that is a product of evolution, but a similar re-
sult in abiogenic processes would require a different and speculative mechanism
of pre-evolutionary self-organization. Exponential scaling in size parameters
transforms broad uncertainties in the scale of abiotic to biotic transition states
into log-broad uncertainties in transition rates. Here we will fold parameters
together and take as a reference value LU[λV t] ≥ 200, though one could easily
argue for much larger LU.
Abiogenesis is the first of a chain of major transitions in the development
of life comparable to our own. Depending on how one defines ones terms, these
could be thought of as contributing to the fl or fi term. There is substantial
evidence that a so-called ”RNA world”, in which both genetic and metabolic
roles were filled by RNA, preceded the current genetic system of DNA, RNA,
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and ribosomally translated proteins [16]. The genetic transition from an RNA-
world biology (or a similar system) to a translation-based biology comparable to
our own may be a requirement for the emergence of complex life and intelligence
within the time available.
As discussed in Supplement I, several models and lines of evidence suggest
that it would be unsurprising to find that alternative genetic systems that either
favor or disfavor functional equivalents of our own biology are either very com-
mon or very rare. An obvious alternative is between a translation-based biology
and a persistent analog of an RNA world; others include enriched-transcript
(rather than translation-based) genetic systems, alternative genetic molecules
(illustrated by known alternative nucleobases and backbones [17, 18, 19]), and
alternatives to uniform, contiguous 3-base genetic codes (again, several have
been described [20, 21, 22]). Each of these alternatives might (or might not)
substantially impede the rate or scope of evolution and hence fail to produce
complex life within the time available in the present universe. In each instance,
several lines of argument indicate that our uncertainties regarding the associ-
ated branching ratios must be regarded as log-broad. More frequently referenced
uncertainties downstream from the development of prokaryote-equivalents (e.g.,
the emergence of eukaryotes, multicellular life, and intelligence itself) contribute
further uncertainties.
3.1.1 The overall uncertainty range for fl and fi
Since our arguments are only strengthened by high uncertainties, we shall con-
servatively take LU[fl] to be 200 and use the uncertainty in fi based on the lit-
erature estimates of 0.001 to 1 (this corresponds to regarding fl as the fraction
of planets with evolutionary competent life rather than just life; see Supplement
II for results with equal uncertainty of fl and fi). We represent the current sci-
entific uncertainty over the rate of abiogenesis per lifetime of a habitable planet
with a log-normal, whose standard deviation is 50 orders of magnitude. It is
highly unclear where to center this distribution, so we have chosen a location
that only makes our argument more difficult: setting the median to the high rate
of 1 abiogenesis event per planet. From this fl is calculated as fl = 1 − e
−λV t
(giving fl mean 0.5 and median 0.63).
3.2 Using these scientific uncertainties in the Drake Equa-
tion
Given the current best estimates and the above argument regarding fl, we can
demonstrate the effect of these uncertainties by combining simple uncertainty
distributions roughly corresponding to the current state of knowledge.4
4In the main text, we treat the Drake equation factors as uncorrelated. While they were
intended to represent independent groups of factors, Ha¨ggstro¨m and Verendel have shown
that if there are enough correlations the Great Filter argument is affected. This could occur
due to spatial or temporal correlations due to panspermias or gamma-ray bursts. We find
that the effect is modest for these two cases (Supplement II).
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Table 1: Parameters of simple sketch of current knowledge.
Parameter Distribution
R∗ log-uniform from 1 to 100.
fp log-uniform from 0.1 to 1.
ne log-uniform from 0.1 to 1.
fl log-normal rate, described in previous section.
fi log-uniform from 0.001 to 1.
fc log-uniform from 0.01 to 1.
L log-uniform from 100 to 10,000,000,000.
In the following we will use the simple sketch of the state of current knowl-
edge as in Table 15.
The results are shown in Fig. 2. They are similar to those generated by
the literature resampling method, but even stronger. The mean for N is very
optimistic, at 27 million, but the median is now only 0.32 – less than one
civilization per galaxy like our own. The probability of N < 1 is now 52%
(up from 30% with literature resampling). Most markedly, the very uncertain
life formation rate produces a heavy left tail, giving a nearly 38% credence that
N < 10−10, making us alone in the observable universe (up from 10% with
literature resampling).6
While the analysis above required us to make our own judgment calls about
how to represent the state of scientific uncertainty for each of these parameters,
our qualitative result is robust to many of these assumptions and can be driven
by our claimed uncertainty in fl alone. Even if all other parameters are set to
the most optimistic point estimates from the literature (with no uncertainty),
we still get 41% credence that N < 1 and 32% credence that N < 10−10 (see
figure S1 in Supplement II). Similarly, even if the estimate for fl were made
much more optimistic, such as by shifting the median value for λl up by 10
orders of magnitude (so that the median rate of abiogensesis on a habitable
planet is in the order of once per year), the effect is minor, since the extremely
broad left-hand tail extends far more than 10 orders of magnitude.
We can thus state our first main conclusion. While using point-estimates in
the Drake equation frequently generates estimates of N that would produce a
Fermi paradox, this is just an artefact of the overconfidence implicit in treating
them as having no uncertainty. When our uncertainty is properly accounted
for in the model, we find a substantial prior probability that there is no other
intelligent life in our observable universe, and thus that there should be little
5Log-uniform and log-normal mean that the log of the variable is uniformly/normally
distributed.
6The distribution shape in log-space is close to a mixture of two Gaussians. The mul-
tiplicative central limit theorem states that products of finite-variance independent factors
tends towards a lognormal distribution as the number of factors increase. However, since
the number of factors is just seven the strongly bimodal fl distribution causes the head-tail
mixture shape.
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Figure 2: (A) A probability density function for N generated by Monte Carlo
simulation based on the authors’ best estimates of our current uncertainty for
each parameter. (B) The corresponding cumulative density function. (C) A cu-
mulative density function for the distance to the nearest detectable civilization.
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surprise when this is what we see. We find this when using the variation in
parameter estimates in the literature as a proxy for our state of uncertainty and
when generating our own summaries of the current state of uncertainty in the
scientific literature.
Note that this conclusion does not mean that we are alone (in our galaxy
or observable universe), just that this is very scientifically plausible and should
not surprise us. It is a statement about our state of knowledge, rather than a
new measurement.
4 Updating on the Fermi Observation
We have used the scientific uncertainty about the parameters of the Drake
equation to construct an ex ante credence distribution for N , but have not
yet factored in the ’Fermi observation’ — the lack of any direct evidence of
ETI. Updating our credences based on the Fermi observation means lowering
our credence in those parameter combinations that produce high likelihoods of
abundant ETI.
There is considerable uncertainty about the range from which a civiliza-
tion’s radiation could be detected. It has been estimated that typical radi-
ation from contemporary humanity could be detected from 18pc, while spe-
cial transmissions such as the Arecibo message could be detected from 30 to
1470pc[23, 24, 25, 26]. However, sky surveys may be much less sensitive[26].
Scintillation may limit the ability to re-detect radio signals beyond a few hun-
dred parsecs[27]. Optical searches could detect megajoule pulses from 10 meter
apertures out to a distance of 60 pc[26]. The Gˆ-survey established that there
were no type III Kardashev civilizations using more than 85% of the starlight
in 105 surveyed galaxies[28].7
Radiation is not the only way we could detect the existence of a civilization.
Another possibility is via interstellar travel — either to our solar system or
to a nearby system from which their radiation could be more easily detected.
Galactic settlement timescales have been estimated to be below 106 yr to 1010 yr,
with most estimates on the order of 107 yr [29, 30, 31, 32, 33]. This leads to the
argument that even for very conservative travel speeds, the entire galaxy would
be occupied in a very short time and hence the lack of observable settlement
provides a strong bound on extraterrestrial intelligence.8
In our framework, the Fermi observation leads to an update of our credence
distribution of N as per Bayes’ rule:
Pr[N |¬D] =
Pr[¬D|N ] Pr[N ]
Pr[¬D]
,
where ¬D denotes no detection. Which value we should use for Pr[¬D|N ]
depends on our model of the Fermi observation.
7With only a small subset of galaxies consistent with >50%.
8While it is rarely considered in the literature, if intergalactic travel is possible, this could
also greatly increase the effective detection range and the bound.
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4.0.1 Random sampling update
If the observation is that out of K sampled stars none have have a civilization,
then:
Pr[¬D|N,K] = (1− (N/NMW ))
K
4.0.2 Spatial Poisson update
If the observation is that there is no civilization closer than some detection
distance d, then:
Pr[¬D|N, d] = 1− e−4pi(N/VMW )d
3/3
4.0.3 Settlement update
Models incorporating interstellar settlement produce very strong updates, but
are also problematic to incorporate in the steady-state Drake equation frame-
work (see Supplement II for more details and several alternative models). If
the observation is that no nearby spacetime volume has ever been permanently
settled, then given a settlement timescale T and an effective age TMW of the
Milky Way the update becomes
Pr[¬D|N ] ≈ e−(N/L)(TMW−T ) +
(
1− e−(N/L)(TMW−T )
) α
α+ 1
,
where 2 < α < 3 is a geometric factor due to the shape of the galaxy.
4.0.4 K3 update
If the observation is that out of K sampled galaxies, none of them have type III
Kardashev civilizations, then given a probability PK3 that type III civilizations
are technologically possible, and a probability PK3 that an intelligent civilization
succeeds in becoming one:
Pr[¬D|N,K,PK3, Psucc] = 1− PK3
(
1− (1− Psucc)
K
)
The effects of conditioning can be seen in Table 2 and Figure 3.
The Fermi observation thus raises our 52% credence for being alone in the
galaxy to somewhere between 53% and 99.6%, depending on the type of evidence
considered. It likewise raises our 38% credence for being alone in the observable
universe to somewhere between 39% and 85%. In both cases the evidence from
scanning nearby stars for radiation signals produces changes on the scale of a
few percentage points, while the evidence of a lack of interstellar settlement in
the Milky Way or other galaxies produces much larger changes.
4.1 Fallible Fermi observations
An important caveat is that an apparently negative observation can be due to
either actual absence or failure to recognize ETI. This can be due to an individ-
ual failure for this particular observation, or a systematic failure at recognizing
13
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Figure 3: Effect of updating on the Fermi observation for different scenarios.
Random sampling: no observations among 1,000 studied stars, spatial Poisson:
no ETI within 18 pc, no K3 civilization: effect of the Gˆ-survey if PK3 = 0.5 and
Psucc = 0.01, no settlement: no interstellar civilization has yet spread to our
location in the galaxy.
Table 2: Comparison of conditioned credence distributions.
Update Mean N Median N Pr[N < 1]
Pr
[N < 10−10]
Median
fl
Median
L
No update 2.7× 107 0.32 0.52 0.38 0.64 1× 106
Random sam-
pling
2.5× 106 0.19 0.53 0.39 0.09 8.6× 105
Spatial Pois-
son
7.8× 104 0.0048 0.57 0.42 3.1× 10−6 4.5× 105
K3 update 1.9× 107 1.2× 10−15 0.66 0.54 4× 10−19 9× 105
Settlement
update
0.072 8.1× 10−35 0.996 0.85 3× 10−38 1× 106
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true ETI. Individual failures include problems detecting the relevant signal as
well as independent choices by the ETIs not to communicate or be visible in
that way. Systematic failure can include systematic problems detecting the rel-
evant signal or systematic reasons that the ETIs do not communicate or are not
visible in that way (such as it being technically impossible).
Given K independent negative observations with individual failure proba-
bility pindiv the update becomes Pr[¬D|N ] = (pindiv + (1− pindiv) Pr[¬d|N ])
K ,
where Pr[¬d|N ] is the probability of not detecting ETI in a single accurate ob-
servation. Even if pindiv is macroscopic, it can easily be overwhelmed by a large
number of observations.
Given a probability psyst of systematic failure, the update becomes psyst +
(1 − psyst) Pr[¬D|N ]. Thus the true posterior is just a linear interpolation
between the prior and posterior one gets when ignoring systematic failure. Given
the magnitude of the previous results, unless one assigns a very strong prior to
psyst being large, our qualitative conclusions still hold.
4.2 Related arguments
Our argument so far is related to a recent argument sketched by Max Tegmark
[34]. Like us, he suggests that we should have great uncertainty about fl and
fi, making us very uncertain about the probability of intelligent life arising
around a given star. He thus models our uncertainty over the average distance
between two independently arising intelligent civilizations as log-uniform. That
is, we should be no more surprised if this average distance were at one order
of magnitude rather than another. Thus, when we gain some evidence that
there is no other civilization within our galaxy, we update this prior by greatly
lowering our credence in the average distance being less than this (≈1021m).
Since there are only six orders of magnitude from the radius of our galaxy to the
radius of the observable universe (≈1027m) and infinitely many beyond that,
he reaches a conclusion that it is unlikely for two civilizations to arise within
the same observable universe. Brian Lacki has suggested an improvement to
Tegmark’s model, in which the log-uniform prior is replaced with a bounded
log-log-uniform prior [35].
Our argument shares the same broad outline. But rather than starting with
a very abstract prior representing initial radical uncertainty over more than
10100 orders of magnitude, we used two different methods to provide a prior
that captured the existing scientific uncertainties of tens or hundreds of orders
of magnitude. We have seen how this is more than enough make an empty
observable universe plausible ex ante (dissolving the Fermi paradox), and quite
likely once we account for the Fermi observation.
5 Updating the factors
So far we have looked at how the Fermi observation affects our credence in
N . We can go further than this and examine how it affects our credence in
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each of the Drake parameters. Updating on the Fermi observation reduces the
expectation of all the parameters. However, parameters with broad distributions
(those with the most uncertainty) tend to have their expectation reduced far
more than parameters with tight distributions (see Supplement IV).
All the observations we consider have a strong effect on our estimates for fl,
a substantially weaker effect on our estimates for L, and almost no effect on our
estimates of the more certain astrophysical factors. As we can see in Table 2,
the observations reduce the median for fl by between a factor of 7 and factor
of 1037, while the median for L is only reduced by a factor between 1 and 2.
Given the state of scientific uncertainty about the Drake parameters and the
Fermi observation, the default guess should hence be that the low-probability
term is likely in the past (fl) rather than the future (fc, L). The Fermi obser-
vation thus provides only very weak evidence about whether we will soon go
extinct or whether interstellar communication or travel is impossible. Instead,
the observation mainly just increases our credence that life is rare.
This conclusion is quite robust to changing the log-uncertainties of the fac-
tors (it remains as long as most uncertainty is in the past factors) or their
distribution shape (using log-normals instead of log-uniform distribution has no
effect). The conclusion can be changed if we reduce the uncertainty of past
terms to less than just 7 orders of magnitude, or if the fc factor turns out to be
radically uncertain.
6 Conclusion
We have seen that a Fermi paradox arises if we combine a high and extremely
confident prior for the number of civilizations in our galaxy with the absence
of evidence for their existence. The high confidence that causes this clash typ-
ically results from applying a Drake-like model using point estimates for the
parameters. These estimates, however, make implicit knowledge claims about
processes (especially those connected with the origin of life) which are untenable
given the current state of scientific knowledge.
When we take account of realistic uncertainty, replacing point estimates by
probability distributions that reflect current scientific understanding, we find no
reason to be highly confident that the galaxy (or observable universe) contains
other civilizations, and thus no longer find our observations in conflict with our
prior probabilities. We found qualitatively similar results through two different
methods: using the authors’ assessments of current scientific knowledge bearing
on key parameters, and using the divergent estimates of these parameters in the
astrobiology literature as a proxy for current scientific uncertainty.
When we update this prior in light of the Fermi observation, we find a
substantial probability that we are alone in our galaxy, and perhaps even in our
observable universe (53%–99.6% and 39%–85% respectively). ’Where are they?’
— probably extremely far away, and quite possibly beyond the cosmological
horizon and forever unreachable.
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